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Author: Rory

Edmonton Criminal Lawyer Ziv > Articles posted by Rory (Page 6)
08 January
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The Intoxilyzer

Posted by Rory
in Intoxylizer Operation

Operating the Breath Instrument (Intoxilyzer) Correctly

 

An excellent decision was provided by Judge Higgerty in Edson, Alberta. The defence counsel in the case was Alan Pearse.

Burping into the Intoxilyzer

The evidence was that the Accused was taken out of the phone room after speaking with a lawyer and asked to provide a breath sample. Given that 15 minutes had not elapsed between being taken out of the phone room and positive evidence that the accused had not burped the judge had reasonable doubt that the machine was not being operated properly. Here is an excerpt:

Depending on whether one is a defence lawyer or a prosecutor, one tends to refer to an Intoxilyzer as a machine or an instrument; being an ex-prosecutor, I will refer to it as an instrument. Certainly a very precise instrument authorized by Parliament to be the centrepiece, if you will, a tool of great use in weeding out impaired drivers on the road, but the fact remains that in many cases an accused is being convicted by an instrument. And I only say that, and it is perhaps a bit of an exaggeration, a bit of a stretch, but I say that in all seriousness because that underscores that the instrument must be operated correctly in order to bring it within the parameters of the Criminal Code of Canad which essentially allows hearsay evidence, a certificate, to be essentially the entire case against an accused.

The requirement is 15 minutes, as set out by the manufacturer, although it seems to be acknowledged by the case law that in most cases 5 minutes would be sufficient, but the manufacturer says 15 minutes. And there is a very good reason for this, the presence of mouth alcohol can result in an unreliable reading.

I did have a question earlier on, and I can perhaps answer my own question, does the accused have to adduce positive evidence that he burped or belched or chewed on a cough drop, that type of thing, during that 15-minute run-up to the first sample and, indeed, I suppose, prior to the second sample as well? And in the real world, given that Officer Jackson had difficulty on the subject of slurred speech, how could we expect an ordinary accused to remember if he or she burped within the 15 minutes prior to providing a sample? So I find that this 15-minute requirement is just as important for the operator to ensure as flipping the right switch at the right time. The 15-minute requirement is an integral part of the operation of the Intoxilyzer and the manufacturer’s requirement was not complied with. I will not speculate as to, and I am lapsing into the vernacular, aw, shucks, golly, it does not mean that much anyway. I will not go there. The facts, to me, are the instrument was operated incorrectly, the manufacturer required that 15 minutes, that 15 minutes was not observed and, therefore, in my view, the instrument was not operated correctly and the presumption cannot be relied upon. Therefore, on the over 08 charge, I also find the accused not guilty.

For a copy of the decision please contact my office at 780-429-4004.Intoxilyzer

 

03 January
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Expert Witness

Posted by Rory
in expert evidence

Expert Witnesses

 

A recent case I found to be very troubling. Thankfully, the judge made the right decision and refused to allow the evidence of an expert witness to be admitted to the jury.

In R. v. Calnen [2015] NSSC 330 the Crown sought to tender the opinion of an expert witness, a medical doctor, Dr. Marnie Woods, about the cause of death of the deceased. Let me say at this juncture I am troubled that the Crown would attempt to lead this type of evidence.

The case concerns a fall from a flight of stairs. The defence theory was that the fall caused the death of the deceased. The crown sought to tender expert evidence which went to “the cause and manner of death”.

Doctor’s Opinion

The doctor stated:

“instantaneous death after such a fall would be distinctly unusual given my experience and the reports described in the reviewed literature” but qualified her opinion “many variables and individual factors must be considered … it is not reasonable to describe one expected outcome … the ability to comment more specifically on this case is limited by the absence of a body [she did not examine the body]”.

If you dissect what the doctor is saying here, she is really saying nothing at all. Her evidence can be rewritten as follows:

falling from a flight of stairs usually doesn’t cause death but I can’t be certain that it didn’t in this case because I haven’t seen or examined the body.

The judge in this case found that the doctor’s evidence was too speculative to have merit. Rather, the judge was persuaded by another doctor’s opinion that the evidence sought to be tendered was “anecdotal” and that the cases Dr. Woods referenced were “unpublished”.

I am reminded of how important the scientific method is, and how in this case it was violated in many respects. The scientific method calls for a theory which can be tested. Results are then published so that they can be re-tested and scrutinized via peer review.

In this case the Crown doctor had a theory. She did not examine the body or review the medical history of the deceased to test her theory nor did she use published cases in support of her theory. The doctor’s opinion runs afoul of the scientific method.

Finally, in this case the judge also did not allow the expert evidence because it went to the ultimate issue of the case – murder v accident.

26 November
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Alcohol

Posted by Rory
in as soon as practicable, Defences, Impaired Driving

Taking Samples — Impaired Driving

Case Comment
R. v. Cole 2015 SKPC 109
A recent Saskatchewan Provincial Court decision applies some very important law concerning taking samples “as soon as practicable”.
When the Crown attempts to prove that someone\s blood alcohol limit is “over 80” they usually can do it one of two ways. Remember, the taking of a sample to determine the concentration of blood in a person’s body only tells you what their alcohol level at the time you the test is taken – not at the time of driving.

(1) The criminal code has evidentiary short-cut that allows a court to conclude that the blood alcohol of a person at the time of driving is or was the same at the as the time the test is taken. This is called the presumption of identity. In order for the presumption to apply several things need to be proven including: that each sample was taken “as soon as practicable after the time when the offense was alleged to have been committed”;
(2) Alternatively, the Crown could call an expert to extrapolate times back from when sample taken to when offense was alleged to have occurred.
In R. v. Cole, a classic defense was raised. Mr. Cole argued that samples where not taken as soon as practicable because the police officer’s waited for a tow truck before transporting the accused back to give a sample.

The judge concluded that it was not necessary for both officers to wait for the tow truck because the car was parked in a safe manner only a few blocks from the police station. Also, they could have called another police officer to assist, they could have waited to have his car towed and there were no passengers that had to be dealt with.
Although the delay in this case was short (12 minutes) the judge determined that the police did not act reasonably in the circumstances.

The touchstone for determining whether the tests were taken as soon as practicable is whether the police acted reasonably (para 12 R. v. Vanderbruggen [2006] 206 CCC (3d) 489 Ont C.A.

Therefore, the Crown were not allowed to use the presumption of identity. The Crown then asked the judge to take judicial notice of the fact that the accused’s blood alcohol would not have been that different from the time of driving to the time the test was taken. He was not prepared to do that. The Crown needed to call an expert and they failed to do so.

04 November
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Pretext Stops

Posted by Rory
in Charter Rights, detention

The “real” reason for the stop (pretext stops)

In Canada, Police are given generous police power when stopping motor vehicles. For example, they are allowed to conduct random stops to check that a driver is properly licensed and has his papers in order. However, Canadian law does draw a line. If it can be shown that that the sole purpose of the stop was to further the other criminal investigation and that there was no intention at all to investigate or pursue the other traffic infraction, the police action can be classified as a ruse or pretext (a pretext is a reason you give to hide the real reason you are doing something.)

The police stop – pretext stop

In R. v. Gayle 2015 ONCJ 575, Justice B. W. Duncan concluded that the a stop of a traffic infraction was nothing more than a ruse to investigate a subject about whether he was in fact following bail conditions (something that the police cannot stop a person for).  In deciding whether a stop has been carried out for a legitimate purpose or as a mere ruse the following questions are useful:

·        Did the traffic concerns continue to manifest themselves throughout the detention concurrently with the other investigation?

·        Was the traffic investigation immediately non-existent or almost immediately abandoned?

·        Was a ticket issued for the traffic violation or was it issued much later in the investigation?

·        Was the stop valid absent the traffic violation i.e. were there grounds for stopping the vehicle absent a traffic violation?

The Supreme Court of Canada

The leading case from the Supreme Court of Canada on this issue is R. v. Nolet [2010] 1 SCR 851. At para 39 of that decision the Courts stated:

Police power, whether conferred by statute or at common law, is abused when it is exercised in a manner that violates the Charter rights of an accused. This is a better framework of analysis, in my opinion, than the “predominant purpose” test applied here by the trial judge. If the Charter is violated, it makes little difference, I think, that the police had in mind multiple purposes. A valid regulatory purpose, whether predominant or not, would not sanitize or excuse a Charter violation.

In Nolet a regulatory search led to the discovery of drugs. Although the officer had suspicion that something was out of place, his reason for searching a bag which ultimately was found to have drug-money in it was to search for vehicle related documents.

Some may view Nolet as being a very pro-Crown friendly case, but I beg to differ. Nolet is very factual. In most cases I suspect the door will be left wide open for a trial judge to find that a police authority was using regulatory authority as a pretext for conducting a criminal search. In Nolet the following para (44) illustrate the point I am making:

The trial judge did not express any doubt about the officer’s evidence that relevant papers were frequently dispersed around a cab, often collected in a bag similar to the one at issue here, and that when he “pushed down on the duffel bag, [he] felt and heard paper products inside” (A.R., vol. 2, at p. 181). In other words, the officer did not proceed immediately to open the bag without some preliminary evaluation of its likely relevance to the regulatory search. The paper contents felt more like items connected to the H&TA inquiry than if the contents had felt solid in a way that might have indicated personal clothing (or drugs). In the circumstances, it was not unreasonable, given the appellants’ very limited privacy interest, for the officer to open the bag. At that point, the cash was in plain view.

19 October
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Detention

Posted by Rory
in detention

Psychological Detention

R. v. Wong 2015 OJ No 5049

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms says “everyone has the right on arrest or detention  …  to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right;”

The Decision

In a recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision, R. v. Wong [2015] ONCA 657 the Court reaffirmed the proposition that detention includes psychological detention and not only physical detention. In the Wong decision a fully dressed police officer entered into an apartment with the consent of the accused. He started noticing some drug related items but didn’t arrest or formally detain the accused.

The Court concluded that as the interaction between Ms. Wong and the officer continued, the officer’s conduct became “increasingly authoritative”.  The detention in this case crystalized when the officer asked questions like “what’s going on here” “if the scale was for baking where are the baking supplies” “I could arrest you for being in possession of drug paraphernalia” .

The Court then also re-emphasized that “without delay” means “immediately” and therefore at the moment Ms. Wong was detained she was required to be informed of her right to counsel, immediately, and because this did not happen all subsequent evidence found (statements and drugs) were ruled inadmissible.  The Court concluded:

In this case, the officer did not know what the law was. He did not understand the circumstances giving rise to detention and he did not appreciate either his responsibilities or the appellant’s rights. The appellant’s rights were trammelled in his search for evidence. The administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by the admission of the evidence, and, in my view, it should have been excluded.

Conclusion

As a criminal defence lawyer who often utilizes the Charter in defence of clients’ it is sometimes very difficult to analyze when a police interaction with a person has become a de facto detention of arrest.  It is critical to know when this Rubicon has been reached because as Wong demonstrates, if evidence is gathered without proper Charter compliance then evidence could be excluded.

 

 

13 October
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Pat-Down Searches

Posted by Rory
in Pat-Down Searches

Pat-Down Search

Until 2004 the scope of police powers regarding their authority to do pat-down searches was uncertain.

In fact, as a law student I particularly found this area of the law especially interesting. Since 2004, the contours and limits of pat-down law have been for the most part well defined. Some recent cases have re-ignited the scope of the pat-down search.

1993

Up until 1993, in Canada, a police officer had no power or authority to conduct a pat-down search on a person unless they had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest that person for an offence. I have no doubt that as a matter of routine, pat down searches were conducted all the time, under the genuine concern for officer safety or perhaps as a ruse or guise to search for evidence. In the latter case such a search would really have been conducted on nothing more than suspicion, an educated guess based on “officer experience”.  In any, event prior to 1993 a bright line existed in the law: detention of a person and search was only permissible if a police officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest a person.  In 1993 in a case called R. v. Simpson (1993) 12 O.R. (3d) 182 the Ontario Court of Appeal decided that the police did not have what they termed “articulable cause” a term borrowed from U.S. jurisprudence to stop and do a pat-down search on the individual they were stopping. In that case, police followed a suspect from a known drug house. They stopped his vehicle, and did a “pat-down” search located narcotics. The Court excluded the evidence and held that the police did not have articulable cause to stop and search for investigative purposes which they defined as:
. . . a constellation of objectively discernible facts which give the detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect that the detainee is criminally implicated in the activity under investigation.

Although Mr. Simpson was acquitted, this decision ushered a new era in Canadian police enforcement. For the first time, a Canadian Court recognized a police power that fell below the status quo level “reasonable and probable grounds”.

2004

In 2004 the Supreme Court of Canada rule on a case R. v. Mann 2004 SCC 52 and endorsed the Simpson decision but replaced the terminology of articulable cause with “reasonable grounds”. The Court held that a pat-down search was permissible but only to the extent necessary to secure officer safety. A police first had to genuinely feel it necessary to conduct a pat-down search for his/her safety. Second, the search would not allow him to search pockets or objects on a person that were non-threatening. For example, a handbag may be searched or patted down but unless an hard object is felt inside the bag there would be no reason to open up the bag.

2015

Some recent cases have questioned the police practice of doing pat-down searches when investigation persons for impaired driving offences. See for example R. v. Schwab 2015 AJ No 903. Simply, if a motorist is transported to a police vehicle for a screening test (assuming that transport is valid), what gives a police officer the right to conduct a pat-down search on the person as a matter of practice?

Certainly, we have not heard the end of the pat-down search issue in relation to impaired driving cases. I will eagerly await an Appellate case and post if one becomes available.

 

08 October
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Defence of Intoxication

Posted by Rory
in Defences

The Defence of Intoxication

For most crimes, the fact that a person voluntarily consumed alcohol/drugs  and became so drunk that they did not intend to commit the particular crime alleged of, would not absolve them of liability. There are however a specific set or subset of crimes where the defence of intoxication could in fact play a part in nullifying or reducing a person’s liability. These types of offences are known as specific intent offences and include offences like murder or theft.

From Murder to Manslaughter

A murder charge could be reduced to manslaughter, a lesser offence, if a jury was left in doubt as to whether the accused intended to cause death or cause bodily harm with the subjective foresight of death. In other words, if a person was so drunk that they did not intended to kill a person through his or her actions then intoxication could assist a person.

In R. v. Steinhauer 2015 ABCA 3 the Alberta Court of Appeal concluded that a new trial was necessary because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that the defence of intoxication was a live issue and could reduce the charge from murder to manslaughter.

Theft and Intoxication

Reluctantly[1] judges have acquitted individuals who were so drunk that they did not form the requisite intent necessary to steal. However, I wouldn’t hold my breath on trying to run this type of defence too often. While the defence is available for theft type offence judges have also set the bar very high in applying the defence[2].

Conclusion

The defence of intoxication remains a viable defence in Canada and should not be discounted in certain circumstances.

—————————————————————————————————————

 

[1] A judge made these comments: “ I cannot leave this decision without expressing my feeling of dissatisfaction at the result. The accused has escaped conviction because the Crown has been unable to rely as it normally does upon certain presumptions for proof of an essential fact to each charge. It has been unable to do so because of diminished capacity self-induced by the accused. Society cannot protect itself against such anti-social activity with its present machinery. New procedures are apparently necessary to prevent individuals such as this accused from benefiting from their own wrongful acts.” see R. v. Bucci [1974] NSJ No. 211
[2] See R. v. Drader 2009 ABPC 360.

07 October
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Refusing to provide a breath sample

Posted by Rory
in Impaired Driving

Refusing to Provide a Breath Sample

When stopped by police and asked to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device, should you comply?

As a general rule the answer to this question is “yes”. A police officer requires very little grounds to demand that you provide a sample of your breath into an approved screening device. The law currently in Canada states that all that is required for him/her to have grounds to demand a sample of your breath into an approved screening device is reasonable suspicion to believe there is alcohol in your blood.

How does the officer form this suspicion? There can be many different ways depending on the circumstances.

Admissions

Firstly, the officer may simply ask “have you had anything to drink”. If the answer is yes and this answer can be linked temporally to your driving then that would be enough grounds. In the leading case in Alberta R. v. Flight 2014 ABCA 185 at paras 58 and 61 the following law was pronounced:

In this way, Hnetka is distinguishable on its facts. The driver in Hnetka said that he had something to drink “a while ago.” Where a driver qualifies an admission of consumption temporally, this alone may not be sufficient to ground a reasonable suspicion: see R v Kimmel, 2008 ABQB 594 at paras 34-35, 459 AR 95. Each case must be assessed on its own facts.

In summary, I conclude that in most cases, admission of consumption alone will be sufficient to ground an objectively reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is a low standard. Police officers are not required to inquire into an alcohol consumption history with a driver at the roadside. However, each case must be assessed on its own facts. Police officers must respond to information as it unfolds.

Indicia

If a motorist does not admit to drinking an officer may still be able to smell alcohol on a motorist’s breath. If the officer is able to convince the trial judge (and on this point he usually can, although, my office has had success in convincing a judge that the officer was mistaken on what he smelled) that he smelled alcohol then that would be enough.  Other indicia would include and accident; slurred speech; blood shot eyes; poor balance and co-ordination etc. etc.

The bottom line

A peace officer needs very little to demand a sample of your breath into an approved instrument. Only unless you are convinced beyond certainty that the officer is simply on a pure fishing expedition without any grounds whatsoever can you refuse in law. This course of action is risky. A refusal conviction is akin to an impaired conviction.

05 October
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Citizen’s Arrest

Posted by Rory
in Charter Rights

R. v. Fitl 2015 AJ No 985

This is a case I conducted. The accused was acquitted after drug evidence was excluded.

The accused was at a rave and was subject to a citizen’s arrest. The trial judge found that the arrest was unlawful because the security guards at the rave did not actually see the accused committing an offence. Furthermore, when the police officer asked the accused for identification, this amounted to an unreasonable search or seizure of the accused. An illegal pat-down search and cell phone search was also found.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

05 October
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After the fact conduct and the defence of provocation

Posted by Rory
in Defences

The Appellant was convicted of second degree murder. He appealed his conviction. The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the Appeal  and ordered a new trial?

After the fact conduct

The Appellant buried the body of his girlfriend after he strangled her. The issues that arose were two-fold: Firstly, the trial judge left the jury with the impression that the Appellant’s after-the-fact-conduct (burying the body) could prove that he intended to kill her. The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that while in some cases after-the fact-conduct could be used as evidence to prove intent, on the facts of this case the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury that the after-the fact conduct did not necessarily prove intent to kill.

Provocation

The second issue concerned the defence of provocation. The trial judge left the jury with an instruction that larger people should have more self-control than smaller people. The Ont. C.A. said at paras 85-86:

     The appellant’s size and athletic ability are not characteristics that have any inherent relevance to the degree of self-control expected of an ordinary person. Large people or good athletes are not expected to have more or less self-control than small people who are not athletic.

     It is unnecessary to fix the ordinary person with the appellant’s size and athletic ability to properly assess whether the alleged provocative conduct was sufficient to cause an ordinary person to lose the power of self-control.

R v. Hill 2015 OJ No. 4758 (Ont C.A)