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criminal law Tag

Edmonton Criminal Lawyer Ziv > Posts tagged "criminal law"

Pretext Stops

The “real” reason for the stop (pretext stops)

In Canada, Police are given generous police power when stopping motor vehicles. For example, they are allowed to conduct random stops to check that a driver is properly licensed and has his papers in order. However, Canadian law does draw a line. If it can be shown that that the sole purpose of the stop was to further the other criminal investigation and that there was no intention at all to investigate or pursue the other traffic infraction, the police action can be classified as a ruse or pretext (a pretext is a reason you give to hide the real reason you are doing something.)

The police stop – pretext stop

In R. v. Gayle 2015 ONCJ 575, Justice B. W. Duncan concluded that the a stop of a traffic infraction was nothing more than a ruse to investigate a subject about whether he was in fact following bail conditions (something that the police cannot stop a person for).  In deciding whether a stop has been carried out for a legitimate purpose or as a mere ruse the following questions are useful:

·        Did the traffic concerns continue to manifest themselves throughout the detention concurrently with the other investigation?

·        Was the traffic investigation immediately non-existent or almost immediately abandoned?

·        Was a ticket issued for the traffic violation or was it issued much later in the investigation?

·        Was the stop valid absent the traffic violation i.e. were there grounds for stopping the vehicle absent a traffic violation?

The Supreme Court of Canada

The leading case from the Supreme Court of Canada on this issue is R. v. Nolet [2010] 1 SCR 851. At para 39 of that decision the Courts stated:

Police power, whether conferred by statute or at common law, is abused when it is exercised in a manner that violates the Charter rights of an accused. This is a better framework of analysis, in my opinion, than the “predominant purpose” test applied here by the trial judge. If the Charter is violated, it makes little difference, I think, that the police had in mind multiple purposes. A valid regulatory purpose, whether predominant or not, would not sanitize or excuse a Charter violation.

In Nolet a regulatory search led to the discovery of drugs. Although the officer had suspicion that something was out of place, his reason for searching a bag which ultimately was found to have drug-money in it was to search for vehicle related documents.

Some may view Nolet as being a very pro-Crown friendly case, but I beg to differ. Nolet is very factual. In most cases I suspect the door will be left wide open for a trial judge to find that a police authority was using regulatory authority as a pretext for conducting a criminal search. In Nolet the following para (44) illustrate the point I am making:

The trial judge did not express any doubt about the officer’s evidence that relevant papers were frequently dispersed around a cab, often collected in a bag similar to the one at issue here, and that when he “pushed down on the duffel bag, [he] felt and heard paper products inside” (A.R., vol. 2, at p. 181). In other words, the officer did not proceed immediately to open the bag without some preliminary evaluation of its likely relevance to the regulatory search. The paper contents felt more like items connected to the H&TA inquiry than if the contents had felt solid in a way that might have indicated personal clothing (or drugs). In the circumstances, it was not unreasonable, given the appellants’ very limited privacy interest, for the officer to open the bag. At that point, the cash was in plain view.

Pat-Down Searches

Pat-Down Search

Until 2004 the scope of police powers regarding their authority to do pat-down searches was uncertain.

In fact, as a law student I particularly found this area of the law especially interesting. Since 2004, the contours and limits of pat-down law have been for the most part well defined. Some recent cases have re-ignited the scope of the pat-down search.

1993

Up until 1993, in Canada, a police officer had no power or authority to conduct a pat-down search on a person unless they had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest that person for an offence. I have no doubt that as a matter of routine, pat down searches were conducted all the time, under the genuine concern for officer safety or perhaps as a ruse or guise to search for evidence. In the latter case such a search would really have been conducted on nothing more than suspicion, an educated guess based on “officer experience”.  In any, event prior to 1993 a bright line existed in the law: detention of a person and search was only permissible if a police officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest a person.  In 1993 in a case called R. v. Simpson (1993) 12 O.R. (3d) 182 the Ontario Court of Appeal decided that the police did not have what they termed “articulable cause” a term borrowed from U.S. jurisprudence to stop and do a pat-down search on the individual they were stopping. In that case, police followed a suspect from a known drug house. They stopped his vehicle, and did a “pat-down” search located narcotics. The Court excluded the evidence and held that the police did not have articulable cause to stop and search for investigative purposes which they defined as:
. . . a constellation of objectively discernible facts which give the detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect that the detainee is criminally implicated in the activity under investigation.

Although Mr. Simpson was acquitted, this decision ushered a new era in Canadian police enforcement. For the first time, a Canadian Court recognized a police power that fell below the status quo level “reasonable and probable grounds”.

2004

In 2004 the Supreme Court of Canada rule on a case R. v. Mann 2004 SCC 52 and endorsed the Simpson decision but replaced the terminology of articulable cause with “reasonable grounds”. The Court held that a pat-down search was permissible but only to the extent necessary to secure officer safety. A police first had to genuinely feel it necessary to conduct a pat-down search for his/her safety. Second, the search would not allow him to search pockets or objects on a person that were non-threatening. For example, a handbag may be searched or patted down but unless an hard object is felt inside the bag there would be no reason to open up the bag.

2015

Some recent cases have questioned the police practice of doing pat-down searches when investigation persons for impaired driving offences. See for example R. v. Schwab 2015 AJ No 903. Simply, if a motorist is transported to a police vehicle for a screening test (assuming that transport is valid), what gives a police officer the right to conduct a pat-down search on the person as a matter of practice?

Certainly, we have not heard the end of the pat-down search issue in relation to impaired driving cases. I will eagerly await an Appellate case and post if one becomes available.