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consent

First Base, Second Base, Third Base, Home

In Canada the rules of sexual engagement are precise. You cannot have sexual relations with another person without their consent. This means that at every stage of a sexual encounter you need to ensure that your partner is consenting to the sexual act being performed or attempted to be performed. 

Yes, this does mean that a man who is kissing a woman deeply and passionately with her consent must obtain consent to then move his hands, for example, onto her breasts. For this act to be legal, the breast touching, there must be some form of “communicated consent”. Absent this consent you have committed a sexual assault. The law of course is not gender specific, the same applies to a woman kissing a man. Before she moves her hands say, onto his buttocks, she must be satisfied that her partner is in fact consenting to this. There is no “implied consent” in Canada. 

See for example R. v. M (ML) 1994 Canlii 77 –”The majority of the Court of Appeal was in error in holding that a victim is required to offer some minimal word or gesture of objection and that lack of resistance must be equated with consent.”

Furthermore, the Criminal Code requires a positive step be taken to ascertain consent s.273.2(b)(c):

It is not a defence … that the accused believed that the complainant consented … where … 

The accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting or there is no evidence that the complainant’s voluntary agreement to the activity was affirmatively expressed by words or actively expressed by conduct.

The law says: before you go to second base you need permission to leave first. 

Under this backdrop that following case is worth noting; R. v. JC 2021 ONCA 131 where the trial judge disbelieved the accused because:

I found JC’s evidence suspect that on each and every occasion when he and HD had sexual activity, that he very carefully put the question of consent to her, and in all instances only proceeded after he specifically requested consent “at each progressive stage of the sexual encounters”. Defence counsel contended that there was no reason not to believe that, especially in respect of the first alleged assault. However, I did not believe JC’s evidence on that issue, and I found that declaration to be too perfect, too mechanical, too rehearsed, and too politically correct to be believed.

 JC wanted me to accept that at each and every stage of each and every sexual encounter, he continuously asked HD if he could go further, but this simply is not in accord with common sense and experience about how sexual encounters unfold. It seemed excessively rehearsed and staged, as he specifically turned to give this answer directly to me. 

So according to the trial judge the accused should not be believed because his actions did not accord with normal human behaviour, or “common sense”. The problem with this reasoning is that the accused did exactly what was required of him by law; request consent at each progressive stage. How can he be faulted for doing that? The Ontario Court of Appeal said the trial judge erred because it was improper to stereotype how normal sexual encounters unfold. Since the law requires “progressive consent”, it is only natural to positively ensure that permission has been granted before advancing further. 

Don’t Forget about Consent

Don’t Forget about Consent

[1]          In R. v. Foster 2020 NBCA 2020 the court overturned a sexual assault conviction because the trial judge failed to put his mind properly to the issue of whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt whether the complainant had in fact not consented to the sexual activity at issue.

[2]          The trial judge conflated the issues of reasonable mistake of communicated consent (a mens rea issue) with the proof of lack of consent (an actus reas issue).

[3]          At para 24 the court summarizes what must be proved:

•               That the accused touched the complainant directly or indirectly;

•               That the touching by the accused was intentional;

•               That the touching by the accused took place in circumstances of a sexual nature;

•               That the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity in question; and

•               That the accused knew that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity in question.

[4]          With regard to the actus reus the court reminds us at para 26 that:

The actus reus of sexual assault is established by the proof of three elements: (i) touching; (ii) the sexual nature of the contact; and (iii) the absence of consent. The first two of these elements are objective. The absence of consent, however, is subjective and determined by reference to the complainant’s subjective internal state of mind towards the touching, at the time it occurred: R. v. Ewanchuk, 1999 CanLII 711 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, [1999] S.C.J. No. 10 (QL), at paras. 25-26. The last element – the accused’s knowledge of the complainant’s lack of consent – deals with the mens rea of the offence, and this is where the defence of mistaken belief in communicated consent comes in.[emphasis added]

[5]         However lack of consent is not necessarily proven by the complainant simply saying “I did not consent to the sexual touching”.  Often in a criminal trial we hear Crown counsel put to  the complainant the question “did you consent to this touching?”. Their answer is not dispositive of the issue. Rather, and this is important, an assessment of the totality of all the evidence in required. At para 41 and 44 of Foster:

A complainant may say she did not consent; however, the trier of fact must decide beyond a reasonable doubt that this is true. At this stage the question is purely one of credibility, which must be assessed by the trial judge in light of all available evidence, including the complainant’s conduct before and during the sexual activity in question, any words or gestures, evidence of any ambiguous or contradictory conduct by the complainant, and any other indication of the complainant’s state of mind at the time. If the trier of fact accepts the complainant’s testimony that she did not consent, no matter how strongly conduct may contradict her claim, the absence of consent is established and the third component of the actus reus of sexual assault is proved. At this point, the actus reus is complete.

At the actus reus stage, the issue is: did the complainant consent? If there is a reasonable doubt that she did, the case is over. The complainant’s state of mind must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the court must look at all available evidence, including the accused’s evidence of what the complainant was doing at the time. If the trial judge believes the complainant’s assertions that she did not consent, the Crown has discharged its obligation to prove the absence of consent. On the other hand, if the trial judge has any reasonable doubt with respect to the complainant’s claim that she did not consent, he or she is simply applying the burden of proof to the actus reus and must find the accused not guilty. [emphasis added]

Conclusion

[6]          Counsel should be alive to all relevant issues and factors that may tend to cast a doubt on the complainant’s assertion that he or she did not consent at the relevant time. Saying “I didn’t consent” is only one factor to consider and must be assessed on the totality of the evidence, including the accused’s evidence.

[7]          Foster even goes further and suggests that post allegation conduct may become relevant. At para 66:

In R. v. L.S., 2017 ONCA 685, [2017] O.J. No. 4586 (QL), the Court had to determine whether evidence related to the relationship between the parties following an alleged sexual assault was relevant. Doherty J.A., writing for the Court, held that evidence, although not determinative of whether an assault occurred, can be relevant in deciding whether the Crown had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the incident described by the complainant (i.e. forced sexual activity) had in fact occurred. He wrote:

 I do not suggest that evidence that E.K. and the appellant continued a relationship that included consensual sexual intercourse after the alleged assault demonstrated that the assault did not occur. Different people will react             differently to the same event. However, to acknowledge that evidence that the relationship continued as before was far from determinative of whether the assault occurred, is not the same as holding that the evidence is irrelevant. Evidence does not have to establish or refute a fact in issue to be relevant; it need only, as a matter of common sense and human experience, have some tendency to make the existence or non-existence of that material fact more or less likely. There is a big difference between evidence that is relevant and evidence that is determinative: see R. v. A. (No. 2), [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1546, at para. 31 (H.C.). This evidence was relevant. [para. 89]

 

 

Capacity to Consent

The Cab Driver – Incapacity to Consent

This is a follow-up to a blog I posted concerning a case where a cab driver was found with a highly intoxicated patron who essentially had her pants down when a police officer stumbled upon them parked (click here for old blog).

At the trial, the trial judge felt that he was left with a factual vacuum so that he could not decide whether the complainant consented to sexual activity at the crucial time. His comment “that a drunk can consent” was the subject of a significant amount of media attention and scrutiny.

Ultimately the Court of Appeal, R. v. Al-Rawi 2018 NSCA 10, stated that this statement of the law was correct but that the trial judge failed to consider s a significant amount of circumstantial evidence in the case about the complainant’s inability to consent. The trial judge’s judgment that “the Crown had no evidence to present on the issue of consent prior to Constable Thibault arriving on scene” was held wrong. There was evidence on the issue of consent or lack thereof.

The Court concluded that the test for incapacity, remembering that, it is a codified provision of the Criminal Code that “no consent is obtained [if] the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity” is:

(1)    A person must understand the nature of the specific sexual act in question;

(2)    A person must understand that he or she has a choice as to whether to participate;

(3)    Know the identity of the person they are engaging in the sexual activity with;

In this case there was evidence that she was incapable of consenting at the relevant time including losing consciousness after the police arrived, having a blood alcohol level in excess of 240 mg, urine soaked pants, being found in the opposite direction of her home and no memory of her time in the taxi. A complete list is found at para 94 of the judgment.

Proving Lack of Consent

The Cab Driver – Failing to Prove Lack of Consent

A controversial case is before an appeal court in Nova Scotia.  When reading the facts please take into account this proposition.

The Crown have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent.

Here are the facts:

On the evening of May 22, 2015, a young woman went to a bar. Her last memory at the bar was drinking two tequila shots and a vodka-and-cranberry mixed drink. Her next memory was speaking to a police officer. She does not recall if this conversation happened in an ambulance or at the hospital.

Other evidence (none of which the complainant remembered) showed that she was prevented from re-entering the bar at one point because of her level of intoxication, she also had a fight with her best friend, sent several text messages to her friends (and therefore was able to carry out a conversation) and hailed a cab.

A police officer came upon the parked cab she was in naked from her breasts down and the cab driver had her urine soaked underwear and pants in his hands.

Based on her alcohol level (220 mg) an expert said her short term and long-term memory would be affected but she would still be able to interact with others.

The trial judge found the cab driver not guilty of sexual assault. His reasoning was that a drunk person can consent to sexual activity and although she may not remember today what happened at the relevant moment he had no other evidence to help him determine what did happen at the relevant time. “But I do not know whether [cab driver] removed her pants at her consent, at her request, with her consent, without her consent, I don’t know.”

Analysis

Drunkenness is not the same as incapacity and a drunken consent is still a valid consent (see R. v Jensen (1996) 106 CCC3d 430).

It is very frustrating that there is a factual gap in this case and because alcohol can make people “say and do strange things” was implausible for the complainant to have stated or somehow consented to the sexual activity in question?  Let’s try to imagine how that would have transpired.

She hails a cab and immediately says to the cab driver “park the car, I’m horny, I want to have sex with you”. The cab driver obliges.

Is this scenario implausible or impossible? If the scenario is impossible then the trial judge got it wrong. If it is implausible (that is unlikely but still possible) it may be dangerous to convict.

I’ll update this blog on the Appeal outcome of this case.